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  vExecutive summary 
Providing disabled people with adequate training is one of the main 
objectives of recent legislative measures against discrimination in the labour 
market for the UK. In fact, when affirmative policies make it difficult for the 
employers to discriminate in terms of pay levels, firms could use poor access 
to training to substitute low current wages with low future wages. Using the 
2004 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS 2004), this 
paper analyses the determinants of training for disabled workers both at the 
individual and at the firm level.  
 
We argue that employers' decisions on training for disabled people are 
based on estimates of the severity of their impairment based on the 
available information. We find that being disabled decreases the probability 
of being trained, but it has a negligible effect on the length of training. We 
also find that workers' expected tenure influences the amount of the 
investment in human capital and that firms provide training by relying on 
hard-to-observe characteristics as long as new information is made 
available. 
 
Aims and objectives 
 
The United Kingdom was one of the first countries in Europe to adopt 
measures to combat discrimination against disabled employees in the 
workplace. While most of the European countries started addressing the 
problem just after 2000 in line with a general European concern, the UK 
Disability Discrimination Act dates back to 1995. However, in spite of such 
an effort on the legislative side, discrimination against ill and disabled people 
at the workplace does not seem to be a rare behaviour in Great Britain as 
shown by recent studies aiming at assessing the degree of enforcement of 
disabled people’s rights (Grainger and Fitzner (2007), Casebourne et al 
(2006))  
 
Unequal access to training for disabled people is a strategic issue to be 
addressed by policy makers, not only because it can hide a form of 
discrimination in future wages as stated by Lazear (1979), but also because 
it is can discourage participation of disabled people at the workplace. In line 
with such a need, the Disability Right Commission's agenda explicitly states 
among its key objectives “to enable disabled adults to renew and refresh 
their skills to gain employment and progress in their careers” (Disability Right 
Commission 2007).   
 
This paper studies the provision of training for disabled people by stressing 
the importance of the contextual factors defining the working environment 
where the disabled people are employed. This information is crucial to 
understand how the presence of an impairment can influence the process of 
investing in human capital and how the implementation of anti discrimination 
1 policies can help to ensure equal opportunities for each worker regardless 
his health status.  
 
Analysis and findings 
 
Using the cross section part of the 2004 Workplace Employment Relation 
Survey (WERS 2004) a new and interesting dataset of British firms matched 
with a sample of employees working in each establishment, the paper 
argues that when available information is scarce, ill-health is perceived as a 
characteristic signalling “risky” i.e. workers who are perceived to be more 
likely to drop out of the labour force, thus making the investment in human 
capital unprofitable.    
 
The statistical analysis is based on the idea that the process of investing in 
human capital can be divided in two parts the first one indicating whether  
the workers received training while the second part defining the actual 
amount of training he gets. In general, most of the model we apply lead to 
the conclusion that ill-health seems to be associated with a worse access to 
training while it does not seem to lead to a lower investment in human 
capital for the sub sample of trained workers. We believe it might be due to a 
lack of information such that the presence of a disability is perceived as a 
signal of a shorter expected tenure in the firm. 
 
In the last part of the paper, we try to take into account the factors 
determining no investment in human capital in the cases in which the 
workers are suitable for the training. This can be read as a situation in which 
the lack of information is reduced: we find that in such a scenario there is a 
separation between a group of disabled people who get more training than 
non disabled people and another group of disabled people which does not 
get training at all.  
 
We believe that our conclusions pose a challenge for policy makers who, on 
the one hand, must make it possible to each employee to declare his health 
status, on the other hand must set up a safety net aiming at preventing every 
form of discrimination against disabled people.  
 
 
 
2 CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
The United Kingdom was one of the first countries in Europe to adopt measures 
to combat discrimination against disabled employees in the workplace. While 
most of the European countries started addressing the problem just after 2000 in 
line with a general European concern, the UK Disability Discrimination Act dates 
back to 1995. Despite this early adoption, discrimination against ill and disabled 
people at the workplace does not seem to be a rare behaviour in Great Britain. 
 
A preliminary analysis by Grainger and Fitzner (2007) on the `first Fair Treatment 
at Work Survey' shows that long term illness and disability play a crucial role in 
explaining the episodes of unfair actions against employees. The authors point 
out that those having a long term illness or disability are twice as likely as other 
workers to have experienced unfair treatment in employment and a poor health 
condition is perceived by the respondents to be the first cause of discrimination.
1 
 
Moreover, among the FTWS respondents who declared they were aware of a 
colleague at their workplace being treated unfairly, 3.8 per cent cite poor health 
conditions as reason for such an unfair treatment. Finally long term ill or disabled 
workers are also more likely to be victims of bulling and sexual harassment. It is 
worth noticing that FTWS shows that unfair treatment on the basis of long-term 
illness seems to be twice as common as for disability, showing that a more 
complex analysis should be carried out. 
 
Such a disadvantage persists although, according to the Employment Rights at 
Work Survey 2005, (see Casebourne et al. (2006)), 92 per cent of employees are 
aware of their rights under disability discrimination law. However, the same 
survey shows that experiencing some forms of illness or disability increases the 
odds of having had a problem at work.
2 
 
Dupre and Karjalainen (2003) point out that among European countries, only in 
Finland is the rate of reported disability over the total number of the working age 
population higher that the one for UK. Although such comparisons can be 
weakened by persistent cultural bias that affect reported disability (Banks et al. 
                                            
1   Unfair treatment is self reported by the employees. Grainger and Fitzner (2007) argue 
that the definition of `unfair treatment' has been chosen because of its being as broad and all-
encompassing as possible. Such a definition does not necessarily imply discrimination 
2   The most common `problems' experienced were related to pay, being informed through 
written contract and statements about the terms and conditions of the job, taking rest breaks at 
work, number of working hours and days. 
3 (2004)), the study shows that the conditions of disabled employees at work 
should be a matter of concern for the United Kingdom. 
 
1.2 Aim of the paper 
 
Using data from the 2004 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey, this 
paper studies the provision of training, with particular attention to the 
opportunities offered to people in poor health conditions. 
 
Although legislative bodies and human rights agencies are concerned about the 
possibility of unequal access to training for workers in poor health, the topic has 
not been directly addressed in the economic literature. The literature on human 
capital has largely studied the determinants of training,
3 but the role of health 
status in determining workers' probability of getting training has often been 
neglected.
4 Analogously, the literature studying the impact of disability on labour 
market outcomes has mainly focused on explaining low employment ratios 
among disabled employees and wage differentials between disabled and non-
disabled. 
 
1.3 Summary 
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional and 
legislative framework; section 3 and 4 discuss the theoretical background and the 
previous evidence; sections 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 present the econometric 
specification and the results; section 10 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                            
3   for a review see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)  
4   Becker (1964) observes health is one of the determinants of workers' productivity, but he 
explicitly admit that the analysis of investment in health is beyond the scope of his work. 
4 CHAPTER TWO 
Institutional and 
theoretical background. 
 
2.1 Disability and training in the UK. 
 
The most important piece of legislation in the United Kingdom dealing with the 
rights of disabled workers is the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) introduced in 
1995 and then updated thorough the following decade in response to the 
European legislation, as a consequence of the `Employment Equality Directive' 
(EU council directive 2000/78/EC). 
 
The DDA defines as `disabled' someone having or having had `a physical or 
mental impairment which has a substantial and long term adverse effect on his 
ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities'. In order to meet the definition of 
disability under the DDA, the person must show that one of the day-to-day 
activities adversely affected involves one of the following capacities: mobility, 
manual dexterity, physical coordination, continence, the lifting or moving of 
everyday objects, speech, hearing or eyesight, memory, concentration, learning 
or understanding and perception of risk and danger. `Long term illnesses' are 
commonly considered those having lasted or being likely to last at least for 12 
months. Such a categorization potentially includes those impairments having 
intermittent although repeated nature. 
 
The DDA makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against disabled 
employees for reasons related to their impairment, unless such discrimination 
can be justified. The DDA applies to recruitment and retention of employees, 
promotions and transfers, dismissals and training. It originally covered only 
employers having 20 or more employees but has been successively extended, 
first to employers of 15 or more employees (December 1998) and to all small 
firms (October 2004) and public bodies (2005). 
 
In addition, in April 2000 the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) was set up with 
the aim of assisting disabled people and establishing the extent to which the 
legislation applied. The role of the DRC has been recently subsumed into that of 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) which, however, does not 
prevent the commission from setting up specific goals for disabled people. The 
DRC's Disability Agenda explicitly states among its key objectives `to enable 
disabled adults to renew and refresh their skills to gain employment and progress 
in their careers' (disability right commission (2007)). In particular, it suggests the 
5 implementation of a `Skills Escalator' programme enabling disabled workers to 
increase their skills and gain higher skilled employment.  
 
2.2. Theoretical background 
 
There is a huge literature in economics studying the determinants of training and 
explaining why firms pay for it. The first piece of work analysing training as a form 
of investment in human capital is Becker (1964). There are two crucial features 
characterising the investment in human capital. The first one is that, unlike the 
investment in physical capital, investment in human capital is irreversible, since 
the skills imbedded in the workers cannot be sold in the market. Secondly, labour 
is a mobile production factor and it is almost impossible for the firms to retain 
those workers they have invested in. Moreover, when training is general, the 
returns of human capital can be enjoyed by future employers who do not bear the 
cost of the investment. As a consequence, firms must be very careful in 
evaluating workers' characteristics before undertaking the investment. In 
addition, for the firms to pay for training, there must be some frictions in the 
market preventing the workers to capture the whole returns to training. 
 
There are a few reasons explaining why disabled employees could be less likely 
to receive firm sponsored training. The first one is prejudice (Becker (1959)) 
arising if employers are biased against disabled employees. The second is 
imperfect information which could lead to statistic discrimination (Phelps (1972); 
Aigner and Cain (1977); Lang (1986); Cornell and Welch 
(1996); Lundberg and Starz (1983)).
5 The state of the available information is 
relevant since the future productivity of the workers is not known before the 
investment, but it can only be predicted on the basis of observed actions or 
observed characteristics. According to Spence's terminology (Spence (1973)) I 
will call the former `signals' and the latter `indices'. 
 
We can think that for disabled workers such a lack of information is even more 
pertinent, since the severity of the impairment can be rarely observed directly 
and it can often be assessed only by a professional. If the employer relates the 
presence of disability to a lower expected productivity, he can be less willing to 
offer firm sponsored training. Moreover, even if the employers are able to 
observe which workers have any impairment, they can hardly have a clear 
picture of their health status and of the consequences their condition might have 
on work related performances. In particular, even in the case where disabled 
employees have on average the same level of productivity as people in good 
health, we can reasonably suppose that the variance in their performance is 
higher than the one for non-disabled people. Oettinger (1996) observes that 
when workers' productivity can be evaluated only through a signal with known 
mean and variance, two different subgroups with the same expected productivity 
can be treated differently due to the difference in the variance of the returns of 
their work. 
 
                                            
5   for a comparison between the two groups see Arrow (1973) and Cain (1986) 
6 For all the aforementioned reasons, it becomes interesting analysing the process 
through which the employers get information about employees' characteristics 
thus employees' suitability for training. 
 
Altonji and Pierret (2001) analyse employers' learning and how information 
affects the outcomes for different subgroups of employers. The authors argue 
that, when firms hire new workers, they discriminate among them on the basis of 
easily observed characteristics, while, after getting new pieces of information 
about the quality of the employees, they start relying on hard-to-observe 
characteristics. In fact, over time firms observe noisy signals of the workers' 
productivity, making the initial information superfluous.  In particular, the paper 
points out that employers' beliefs about workers' productivity can influence the 
amount of training, thus affecting future wages. 
 
An important piece of information the firms must take into account in deciding 
their investment in human capital is the expected tenure of the workers. In fact, 
like any other form of investment, the cost of training must be counterbalanced 
by the stream of expected returns generated by the increase in the worker's 
productivity. The investment is worthy for the firms only if the increase in the 
productivity can be enjoyed for a period of time long enough to cover the cost of 
training. 
 
Kuhn (1993) sets up a model in which firms match employees having different 
degrees of labour market attachment with available jobs by involuntarily 
discriminating on the basis of demographic attributes. In particular, shared 
investments in firm specific training are offered mainly to those having a higher 
exogenous probability of remaining in the labour market in the period following 
the training. The centrality of the probability of leaving the firm becomes the 
rationale for the idea of `delayed training' (Loewenstein and Spletzer (1997)). The 
authors show that it can be preferable for employers delaying training in order to 
get better information on the `quality' of the workers. Such behaviour may be 
optimal for the firms because it makes it possible for the employers to provide 
training only to those workers who are less likely to leave the job.  
 
The importance of expected tenure of the workers is also discussed by Idson 
(1996) in order to explain why firm sponsored training is more frequent in large 
firms. The author argues that in large firms there is higher intra firm job mobility 
related to a longer duration of employment. Such a longer time horizon makes 
large firms more willing to provide training. Finally, Royalty (1996) estimates job-
to-job and job-to-non employment probabilities as proxies for the estimated time 
horizon for the investment in human capital and she argues that workers differing 
in their labour attachment have different probabilities of receiving training. 
 
The latter set of models becomes even more interesting if applied to workers in 
bad health. In fact, on one hand we can think that disabled employees have a 
higher probability of leaving the firm since they have a high probability of 
dropping out of the labour force due to the impairments they have. On the other 
hand, people whose impairment is not severe can be less likely to leave the firms 
since they have worse outside options due to their difficulty in finding another 
7 suitable match.
6 For example, hiring a worker with an impairment can imply 
higher starting costs if disabled workers are able to perform a narrower range of 
tasks than non-disabled. This, for the former, makes the probability of mismatch 
to increases, thus making matching costs to rise. Moreover, hiring costs can rise 
due to the need of making workplace modifications to enable the disabled person 
to work. This type of costs allows the firm to capture part of the returns to 
training. (Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), Acemoglu (1997)) 
 
Finally, the firm decision strategy is affected by anti-discrimination policies. 
Lazear (1979) observes that when affirmative policies make it difficult for the 
firms to discriminate in terms of pecuniary wages, the employers try to substitute 
current wages with future wages. As a consequence, even where there is no 
difference in the current wages between subgroups, the difference in unobserved 
non pecuniary components of the wage tends to increase, since an unequal 
access to training can be viewed as an unequal access to future wage growth. 
 
My paper is based on the idea that there exist `safe' and `risky' forms of 
investment. I consider `safe' an investment which guarantees a long expected 
stream of future revenues.  In line with that, I distinguish between `risky' and 
`safe' disabled workers on the basis of their probability of leaving the firm. The 
former have severe impairments, thus a high probability of dropping out of the 
labour force due to illness.  The latter, whose disability is not severe, display 
higher matching and mobility costs and lower job-to-job mobility due to poor 
outside options. 
 
Since people's health condition is not completely observable, employers get only 
noisy signals of workers' quality. As a consequence, decisions on training for 
disabled employees are based on estimates of the severity of their impairment 
based on available information. 
It has been already pointed out that expected tenure is a key variable in 
understanding the determinants of training. In fact, the longer is the time horizon 
of the investment in human capital, the higher is the net present value of such an 
investment. We expect employers to provide training to disabled employees only 
when they can be reasonably sure they are not undertaking a risky investment. In 
other words, I argue that training is selectively provided only to those disabled 
employees who are likely to have a lower probability of leaving the job. 
 
If firms use Bayesian learning to make their choice, differences in the estimated 
future tenure between the two groups of disabled have further consequences. In 
fact, in a Bayesian setting, expectations about workers' probability of staying with 
the firms are based also on people's past job history. Hence, employers conclude 
that disabled employees who have been working in the same firm for long time 
must belong to the group of `safe' disabled, so they must have a low probability 
of leaving the firm.  
                                            
6   for a discussion of the impact of outside options on the probability of leaving the firm see 
Blackaby, Booth, and Frank (2005) 
8 2.3. Previous evidence 
 
A growing literature studies the consequences of disability on labour market 
outcomes, but, as far as I am aware, no one of the papers analyses explicitly the 
relationship between poor health and training. The low rate of employment 
among disabled employees and the wage gap between workers in good health 
and workers having any form of impairment made the literature to focus on the 
impact of disability on work participation, type of employment  and earnings (for 
the UK see: Bardasi et al. (2000); Blackaby et al. (1999); Kidd et al (2000); 
Jenkins and Rigg (2003); Madden (2004), while for the US see: Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001); Baldwin and Johnson (1994, 1995, 2000); Haveman et al (1991); 
Kruse and Schur (2003)) In general, all these pieces of work conclude that 
disability has a negative effect both on employment and on wages. Pelkowski 
and Berger (2004) find that temporary health problems have no significant effects 
on earnings. Nevertheless, I argue that even if a bad health condition does not 
affect current wages, it is likely to influence future wages if it is correlated with a 
lower access to training. This makes temporary impairments to have permanent 
effects in the long run. 
Few papers study the relationship between disability and expected tenure, which 
is of primarily importance in our analysis. Baldwin and Schumacher (2002) focus 
on involuntary job changes. They observe that disabled workers have a higher 
probability than non-disabled workers to experience involuntary job changes. It 
can be due either to discrimination in firing or job mismatch among workers with 
disabilities. However, when other forms of job mobility are analysed, the authors 
do not find significant differences between disabled and non-disabled workers. 
 
Using multinomial probit models on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY), Royalty (1996) estimates the determinants of job-to-job and job-
to-unemployment turnover. She finds that bad health increases the probability of 
making the transition to unemployment for every group of workers, while it 
increases the probability of job-to-job turnover only for low educated employees. 
It is worth noticing that the data include also transitions due to layoffs. It can 
partially explain the results the author got for job-to-job turnover for people in bad 
health. In fact, low educated workers having a form of illness or disability are 
more vulnerable and they are more likely to experience downward job-to-job 
transitions. On the contrary, for more educated workers, disability lowers the 
probability of job-to-job turnover, since it narrows the range of available outside 
options. 
 
Royalty (1998)  studies the effect of the probability of job turnover on the 
probability of receiving training. The author argues that different degrees of 
labour market attachment create differential incentives for investment in human 
capital. In particular, she argues that health status does not influence the amount 
of offered training through a direct channel, but through labour turnover since 
poor health conditions affect the expected time horizon of the investment in 
human capital. Finally, the paper observes that those articles finding an effect of 
9 tenure on training but not controlling for the expected time horizon of the 
investment may suffer from omitted variable bias. 
 
Royalty (1998)  provides a rare example of a paper discussing the impact of 
disability on training, although the consequences of poor health conditions are 
not the main focus of the work. Most of the remaining literature on the 
determinants of training has not studied the investment in human capital for 
disabled
7 and it has not even included health status among the explanatory 
variables. A partial exception to this lack of interest is Addison and Belfield 
(2004). Using WERS 1998, the authors study the variables influencing `training 
incidence' (whether the worker got trained in the 12 months before the interview) 
and `training intensity' (how many days of training he got). Although the main 
focus of the paper is not studying the impact of disability on training, Addison and 
Belfield include workers' health status among the controls and they found a 
positive (though not significant) effect of disability on incidence of training and a 
opposite effect (but still not significant) on the intensity of training. Hence, 
according to their results, ill-health does not seem to be an important determinant 
of training and the common concern about an unequal provision of training for 
disabled employees does not seem to be justified. 
 
However, it is worth noticing that in WERS 1998 the question asking for the 
amount of training the worker got does not explicitly exclude health and safety 
training.
8 The choice of including health and safety training is meaningful for 
those who want to study the opportunities of training for disabled employees.  
Including health and safety training in the count of days devoted to investing in 
human capital can mask an unequal provision of training for people in different 
health status. In fact, if such kind of training is offered mainly to disabled workers, 
the distribution of the overall training turns out to be more equal than the 
distribution of those investments in human capital leading to increases in future 
wages. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
7   Instead, much emphasis has been given to the opportunity of training offered to other 
disadvantaged subgroups of workers such as low educated people, women and ethnic minorities 
(Lynch (1992); Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan (2004) ; Blundell, Dearden, and Meghir (1996)) or 
to the impact of labour market institutions on human capital accumulation (Arulampalam, Booth, 
and Bryan (2004), Almeida-Santos and Mumford (2005), Booth and Böheim (2004); Booth, 
Francesconi, and Zoega (2003)) 
8   while WERS 2004 does 
10 CHAPTER THREE 
Data and sample 
description  
 
3.1 WERS 2004 
 
This paper uses the cross-section part of the 2004 Workplace Employment 
Relation Survey (WERS 2004). WERS 2004 cross-section survey is based on a 
stratified
9 random sample of British establishments having more than 5 
employees and a random sample of employees within each establishment. 
 
The sampling procedure of workplaces excluded firms operating in agriculture, 
hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying as well as all private 
households with employed persons and extra territorial bodies. As a 
consequence, the dataset covers workplaces belonging to the sectors of 
manufacture, electricity gas and water, construction, wholesale and retail, hotels 
and restaurants, transports and communication, financial services, other 
business services, public administration, education, health and other commercial 
services. Those firms selected for the 1998-2004 WERS panel dataset are also 
excluded.
10  
 
The primary unit sampling yielded a sample of 2,295 firms. In the responding 
workplaces a fixed number of employees was interviewed.
11 The final design 
yielded a sample of 22,451 workers. 
 
 
                                            
9   the strata are constructed on the basis on the basis of the SIC sector of activity and the 
IDBR recorded workforce size. 
10   WERS includes a set of matched employer-employees cross sections and a panel of 
firms. Firms contained in the panel are not surveyed for the cross sectional part 
11   for firms having less than 25 workers all the employees have been included in the 
sample, while for smaller firm a random sample of 25 workers has been drawn. 
11 3.2. Selected sample 
In line with the literature on WERS
12, I chose to include in our sample just private 
firms, since public and private firms are likely to face different incentives and to 
be exposed to a different degree of risk.  
 
Private and public workplaces seem also to differ in a series of characteristics 
related both to disability and training. Descriptive statistics on managers' answers 
show that public firms have a higher percentage of disabled workers than private 
firms. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the share of disabled employees for the 
two groups. We can see that 88 per cent of the managers employed in the 
private sector declare that no disabled employees work in their firm. In public 
sector firms such a percentage only exceeds 78 per cent. 
 
 
Table 3.1: number of disabled people 
 
   private  public 
percentage disabled  perc cum perc  cum 
0 88.08 88.08 78.59  78.59 
less than 1 percent  1.14 89.22 1.59  80.18 
1 to less than 2 percent  1.46 90.68 2.96  83.14 
2 to less than 3 percent  1.27 91.95 3.23  86.37 
3 to less than 4 percent  1.27 93.13 3.23  89.6 
4 to less than 6 percent  1 94.13 2.15  91.75 
6 to less than 10 percent  2.08 96.2 3.95  95.69 
more than 10 percent  3.8 100 4.31  100 
number of valid cases  1,601   505 
 
Not only are public and private firms different in their average number of disabled 
workers, but they also differ in the level of implementation of the policies against 
discrimination. The manager questionnaire contains an extensive section dealing 
with Equal Opportunities policies and practices in the workplace. The data 
summarised in table 3.2 show that in the public sector the practices promoting 
fair treatment at work for disabled employees are much more common than in 
the private sector. 
 
 
                                            
12   see, for example, Booth and Böheim (2004) 
12 Table 3.2: Policies against discrimination 
 
   private  public 
favouring applications of disabled  5.75  31.1 
policy mentioning discrimination against disabled  48.69  83.01 
monitoring recruiting and selection  14.21  54.01 
reviewing recruitment and selection  12.45  41.84 
monitoring promotions  5.1  23.06 
reviewing promotions  6.11  27.2 
reviewing relative pay rates  2.01  11.5 
 
When we look at the proportion of trained workers that emerges from the 
managers' questionnaire, we observe that in public firms 44.51 per cent of the 
managers declare that the whole workforce is trained, while in the private sector 
the same answer is given only by less than 27.00 per cent. Again, employers 
reporting no training at all are 26.04 per cent in the private sector and a tiny 4.31 
per cent in the public sector (see table 3.3). 
 
 
Table 3.3: Proportion of trained workers 
 
   private  public 
proportion of trained workers  perc  cum perc  cum 
all (100%)  26.95 26.95 44.51 44.51 
almost all (80-99%)  5.33 32.28 11.41 55.92 
most (60-79%)  7.31 39.59 9.49 65.41 
around half (40-59%)  8.42 48.01 13.54 78.95 
some (20-39%)  9.88 57.9 7.86 86.82 
just a few (1-19%)  16.06 73.96 8.47 95.28 
0 26.04 100 4.72 100 
number of valid cases     1,694    566 
 
Finally, not only do public firms offer training to a greater proportion of employers, 
but they also provide workers with longer programmes (table 3.4). 
 
 
Table 3.4: days of training 
 
   private  public 
days of training  perc  cum perc  cum 
no time  2.03 2.03 0.22 0.22 
less than one day  5.69 7.73 4.67 4.89 
1 to less than 2 days  27.64 35.36 15.4 20.29 
2 to less than 5 days  36.31 71.67 36.78 57.07 
5 to less than 10 days  14.85 86.52 25.85 82.91 
10 days or more  13.48 100 17.09 100 
number of valid cases     1,427    525 
 
I have also excluded those observations for which I did not have complete 
information on the variables of interest. The exclusion of missing records led to a 
18.52 per cent decrease in the sample size. The distribution of the missing 
values does not present sharp differences across categories of respondents 
13 although very young and older workers as well as workers belonging to ethnic 
minorities have lower response rate. Unsurprisingly, people in good health have 
a higher response rate than those having a  disability, being the percentage of 
non respondents equal to 7.93 per cent for people in good health, 9.35 per cent 
for those having a non work limiting disability and 9.77 per cent for those having 
a work limiting disability. However, mean comparison tests suggest that the 
response rate is statistically different only when we compare people in good 
health and people living with a work limiting disability, while the intermediate 
categories do not seem to differ in this respect. 
 
As a consequence, the broader sample I used includes 12436 workers clustered 
in 1177 firms. 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
First of all I am interested in the proportion of disabled in the WERS sample. 
WERS describes health related conditions through single-item, global and self 
reported questions. Due to self reporting, the derived measure of disability must 
be considered subjective. 
 
The data permit us to derive two alternative measures of disability.
13 The first 
definition is indicated by the acronyms LSI and it describes self reported Long 
Standing Illness or disability (LSI). The idea of LSI is meant to capture the 
negative effect of poor health as perceived by the respondent. The acronym for 
the second definition is WLD. It indicates a `Work Limiting Disability' reflecting the 
respondent's perception of his ability to carry out paid work. The question 
assessing WLD is always hypothetical in order to avoid an endogenous recording 
of health status. In fact, the respondents are asked to relate their health 
conditions to the type of job they can, might or could do. 
 
In the WERS cross section of employees, health condition is assessed through 
two different questions. Workers are first asked whether they have a long term 
illness, health problem or disability
14 and then they are asked whether their 
illness or disability affects the amount or type of work they can do. Such a two 
step question, which allows a distinction to be made between two different 
classes of ill and disabled employees, was introduced in the last survey, since 
WERS 1998 used the LLSI definition.
15 This means that any comparison 
between the two surveys on estimates of disability must be done with caution. 
 
The presence of two different but related questions regarding people's health 
status makes it difficult to create a measure of disability without making 
assumptions on the basis of their responses. In particular, I decided to exclude 
                                            
13   there are other two possible definitions which are not used here i.e. whether the 
respondent is covered by the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA disabled) and whether the 
individual has an impairment limiting him in his in their day-to-day life (LLSI: `Limiting Long 
Standing Illness or disability') 
14   where a `long-term' disability is defined is an illness, health problem or disability 
  that can be expected to last for more than one year 
15   the exact wording of the 1998 survey is `do you have any long standing health problem 
or disability which limit what you can do at work, at home or in your leisure time?' 
14 from my analysis those whose answers were not coherent i.e. those answering 
the question defining the consequences of the impairment on job performances 
after declaring they do not have a LSI. The appendix explains this choice and it 
compares the distribution I got with the estimates derived from other important 
surveys in the UK. 
 
Table 3.5 sheds light on the health status of the workers employed in private 
firms. According to my data, more than 87 per cent are in good health, almost 5 
per cent has a disability limiting the amount or the type of work they can do and 
the remaining 8 per cent has a long lasting illness which, however, does not 
affect job performances. 
 
Table 3.5: workers’ health status in private firms 
 
health status  perc  cum 
good health  87.39 87.37 
work limiting disability (WLD)  4.89 92.28 
non work limiting disability  7.72 100 
number of valid cases     13,596 
 
Figure 3.1: proportion of trained workers by tenure 
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In the previous paragraph I argued that actual tenure is an informative variable in 
explaining the provision of training. Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of trained 
workers in each recorded band of tenure. Unsurprisingly training is offered in the 
first part of people's career and it declines with tenure, however, such a 
relationship does not seem to be linear, given that the bigger investment in 
human capital seems to take place between the first and the second year of 
tenure. 
15 Figure 3.2: number of days of training by tenure 
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When we look at the number of days of training (see figure 3.2), we get a similar 
pattern displaying a peak between the first and the second year in the firm and a 
decreasing trend after reaching the maximum. Such a stylised fact indicates that 
there is a type of training (not necessarily induction training) which is offered to 
the workers when they are still in the earlier part of their career, but they have 
spent some time in the firm.
16 It is in line with the idea that the employers prefer 
to delay training in order to collect more information on the quality of the workers 
(Loewenstein and Spletzer (1997)) Similarly, training taking place in the first year 
of tenure can be interpreted as a `screening device' as argued by Autor (2001). 
 
If we analyse the provision of training by dividing the workers according to their 
health status,
17 we notice that the proportion of workers who are trained is lower 
for disabled people than for people in good health (see figure 3.3). It suggests 
that when health and safety training is excluded rom the calculus of the days 
devoted to increasing workers' human capital, the public concern about a lower 
access to training for people in bad health seems to be justified. Such a gap does 
not seem to change significantly with tenure. 
 
                                            
16   This training has not been necessarily provided after at least one year in the firm, 
however, being the respondents in their second year in the establishment, the information 
reported is unlikely to refer to the proper induction training which takes place in the very first few 
weeks after being hired.   
17   I have used the LSI definition of disability by putting together WLD and non WLD 
disabled 
16 Figure 3.3: Proportion of trained workers by tenure and health status 
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Figure 3.4 looks at the number of days of training offered to people in different 
health status. The gap between disabled and non-disabled employees is very 
large for newly hired, it almost vanishes between the first and the second year in 
the firm, then it appears again after the peak and declines with tenure.
18  
                                            
18   the group of those having tenure between 5 and 10 years is the smallest group, which 
makes descriptive statistics for this band slightly unreliable 
17 Figure 3.4: number of days of training by tenure and health status 
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It is not desirable drawing strong conclusions on the basis of figure 5.4. alone, 
given that some of the variance in the height of the bars is due to the upper value 
we used for the right censored band in the number of days of training (more than 
10 days). However, the graph leads to think that there might be a postponement 
in the induction training for people with disabilities, which might explain both the 
huge gap between disabled and non disabled people for the days of training 
offered to people in their first year in the firm and the `catching up' which seems 
to take place in the case of people who are in their second year in the firm. An 
explanation for such a phenomenon could be that, when the employers do not 
have enough information about workers' `quality', they use disability as a signal 
of low productivity or poor labour attachment. This leads to a lower access to 
training for newly hired disabled worker and, perhaps, to a postponement of the 
investment in human capital for a sub sample of disabled employees. 
 
 
 
18 CHAPTER FOUR 
Investing in human 
capital 
 
4.1. A two parts process 
 
The main intuition of this paper is that the process of investing in human capital 
can be divided in two parts: the first one indicating whether the worker got any 
training and the second one indicating how many days of training she got, 
conditional on being selected for training. As a consequence, the probability of 
receiving  x days of training can be written as: 
 
( ) () ( ) 0 | 0 > = > = = x x x P x P x x P  
 
where  ( 0 > x P )  is the probability of getting any training and  ( ) 0 | > = x x x P  is the 
probability conditional to get a positive amount of training. 
 
In line with part of the literature on training (see, for example, Addison and 
Belfield (2004) and Booth and Böheim (2004)), I will call the first part of the 
process `training incidence', while the second part `training intensity'. I believe 
that it is informative to study separately `training incidence' and `training intensity' 
since they are different in nature. In particular, the sub sample of those receiving 
training is not a random sample of the total workforce, but it is mainly composed 
by workers who are perceived to be `safe investments'. 
 
My dependent variables are derived by using the question in WERS asking the 
employees: `apart from health and safety training, how much training have you 
had during the last 12 months, either paid for or organised by your employer?'. 
The possible answers are: `None', `Less than 1 day', `1 to less than 2 days', `2 to 
less than 5 days', `5 to less than 10 days', `10 days or more'. Training incidence 
is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the worker got any training. In my 
specification training intensity indicates the number of days the worker got, given 
that she got a positive amount of firm sponsored training. As a consequence, I 
excluded the null records and I focused on the observations reporting positive 
amounts of training.
19 
 
                                            
19   In this choice, our paper is different from the previous literature 
19 4.2 Explanatory variables and their expected coefficients  
 
The independent variables can be divided in two groups: individual and firm 
characteristics. 
 
Among the individual variables, the one we am mostly interested in is `disability' 
since the aim of the paper is studying whether and in which cases ill-health is 
associated with poor access to training. We mainly focused on the LSI definition 
of disability defining as `disabled' those having an impairment which lasted or it is 
expected to last for at least 12 months. We did this for two reasons. First the 
perception of disability is likely to depend partially on the respondent's 
occupation, as a consequence, using the WLD definition of disability introduces 
an additional potential source of endogeneity. Second, since disabled employees 
are a small percentage of the whole workforce, splitting them into two groups 
does not seem to be desirable, since the number of observation for each group 
becomes really tiny.  
 
One of the most important variables is workers' actual tenure. As my descriptive 
statistics have shown, people's actual tenure seems to be important for 
understanding the provision of training for people in poor health. However, any 
statement about any causal effect of tenure on training must be made with 
caution, since the variable is clearly endogenous. Nevertheless, we think that the 
sign of the correlation between actual tenure and firm sponsored training is 
extremely meaningful in the case of people in poor health. Tenure is measured 
by using three dummy variables. The first one indicates whether the respondent 
has been working in the firm for a period of time ranging from one to two years. 
This is also the reference category since we have shown that in this time band 
there is a peak in the amount of training provided (whatever indicator is used) 
and the investment in human capital seems not to be different for workers in 
different health conditions. 
 
Moreover, in order to exploit better the relationship between disability and 
permanence within the firm, I included also a set of interactions between 
disability and tenure which are meant to capture the changes in the effect of 
disability as long as the time spent in the firm increases. 
 
The individual controls are: sex, age (in linear and in quadratic form), ethnicity, 
marital status, presence of dependent children, higher educational qualification 
and occupation (SOC 2000 major groups).
20  
 
Furthermore, we controlled for a dummy indicating whether in the twelve months 
before the interview the respondent has ever worked more than 48 hours a week 
(to control for absence).
21 The information on the extra hours worked is aimed at 
                                            
20    Controlling for education and occupation can hide the indirect effect of disability on 
training, since disabled employees are more likely to be less educated and to be in low-paid jobs 
(Hale et al.  (1998); Blackaby et al. (1999)). However, we think that failing to control for those 
variables would lead to biased estimates 
21   the variable takes value equal to one if the worker has never done extra hours in the 
time span considered 
20 capturing the time spent at work in the year before the interview in order to take 
into account not just the usual workload, but also the presence at work during the 
time span in which also training is recorded. It can be a (negatively related) proxy 
of the days lost due to poor health conditions. Workers in poor health conditions 
can be more likely to be excluded from training not only because their probability 
of being selected for training in a specific day is lower (for example because the 
firms think they are not a safe investment), but also because they simply have 
fewer available working days, since they are more likely to be absent from work 
as a consequence of their illness. 
 
The WERS managers' questionnaire provides a broad set of firm specific 
variables permitting the analysis of the effect of firm level covariates on the 
decision of offering paid off-the-job training.
22 Perhaps the most important set of 
firm level variables is the one referring to the average expected tenure for 
workers in the firm since believe that the expected tenure of the worker helps to 
understand why firms invest in workers' human capital. In order to construct such 
a variable we used the managers' questionnaire where the employers are asked 
the extent in which they agree or disagree with the sentence: `Employees are led 
to expect long-term employment in this organisation'. The question is important 
not only since it sheds some light on the average expected tenure of the workers 
for each firm, but also because it gives some information on the way in which the 
tenure is perceived by the employers. Using information derived from the 
employers' side is informative, given that the variable determining firms' 
investment in human capital is not the actual tenure of the workers, but the 
expectation the managers have on that. 
 
The answers to this question are recorded in five bands, depending on whether 
the manager declared to `strongly agree', `agree', `neither agree, nor disagree', 
`disagree' or `strongly disagree' with the sentence presented. I collapsed the first 
two and the last two categories and I divided the firms into three groups. In the 
first group (long tenure) we have included all those firms in which workers are 
likely to expect a long tenure, while in the second group (neither long nor short 
tenure) there are all those firms whose managers answered they neither agreed 
nor disagreed with the statement. Finally, in the last group, which is also the 
reference group for the dummy variables, we aggregated all those firms whose 
managers disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
 
Being a subjective measure, the validity of the variable can be questioned. Figure 
4.1 plots a raw measure of labour turnover for each group of expected tenure. 
WERS 2004 does not contain a direct measure of workers' turnover, but it reports 
the number of employees who left the firm due to dismissals, resignations, 
redundancies and other reasons including retirements. We think that the first 
three causes can be negatively correlated with tenure. Since the category `other 
                                            
22   studying the consequence of disability on people's life becomes even more important 
after the introduction by the World Health Organisation of the `biopsychosocial model of 
disability'. In fact, the `International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health' (ICF) 
developed in 2000 provides a new standard framework for the analysis of health and health-
related states and it emphasises the importance of the interaction between health status and 
environment where people live (see WHO (2002). 
21 reasons' includes retirements, we suspect that this can be positively correlated 
with average expected tenure, being tenure closely linked to age. 
 
We created the variable summarising the number of people who left the firm in 
2003 by adding just dismissals, redundancies and resignations. Then we 
computed the mean of the variable for each of the three groups of expected 
tenure constructed according to what stated in the employers' questionnaire. 
Group number one in the x axis includes all the firm whose managers declared 
they either strongly agree or agree with the aforementioned question, group two 
includes all those firm where no clear answers were given and group three 
includes firm where workers are perceived not to expect a long tenure. The mean 
of the variable, computed for each group of declared expected tenure, has the 
expected behaviour, given that it is low for the group 1 and it increases 
monotonically for the following groups, thus giving evidence in favour of our 
measure for the expected time horizon of the investment. 
 
Figure 4.1: percentage of workers who left the firm in the year before the interview 
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Moreover, we included a set of firm level variables indicating firms' attitudes 
towards training and disability. Among the former, the first set of dummies 
indicates the presence of direct forms of consultation about training between the 
employers and the employees and it is a measure of the possibility for the 
workers to influence directly the process of skill formation. In the WERS 
managers' questionnaire the workers are asked whether there exist `meetings 
between senior managers and the whole workforce (either altogether or group by 
group)', furthermore, they are asked to indicate the content of these meetings. A 
similar question assesses the presence of meetings where supervisors and line 
managers discuss with the workers they are responsible for. Finally, the 
22 questionnaire asks if there are committees of managers and employees aimed at 
consultation rather than negotiation (`joint consultative committees', `works 
councils' or `representative forums') and the topics they mainly deal with. 
 
Since alternative forms of direct participation display a great level of 
complementarity or substitutability, responses to the aforementioned questions 
are likely to be highly correlated. As a consequence, we aggregated them in a 
set of three dummy variables. Therefore, we divided the firms in three groups. 
The first group is composed by all the firms where there is no form of direct 
consultation or negotiation. The second group includes those workplaces where 
there is at least a meeting or a committee where employers and employees can 
interact directly but training is not among the topics discussed. The third group 
indicates the firm where there are both direct consultation through meetings or 
committees and discussion about training. The last group is also the reference 
category. 
 
Obviously direct consultation is not the only channel through which employers 
and employees interact. WERS contains information also about the use of 
representative bodies. In particular, the managers' are asked whether there is 
any form of bargaining with the employees' representatives on a set of topics 
including training. A scale of different degrees of interaction is used, ranging from 
`no interaction at all' to `negotiation of training'.
23 The question is asked twice: 
the first time referring to unions and the second time referring to non union 
representatives. We created a variable indicating whether there exists any form 
of negotiation on training between employers and either union or non union 
employee representatives. 
 
We have also created a variable summarising firms' attitude towards fair 
treatment at work with a particular focus on disability.
24 I have first considered if 
firms have a formal written policy on equal opportunities explicitly mentioning 
disabled people among the protected categories. Moreover, I have considered 
the following anti discrimination actions: whether recruitment, selection and 
promotion procedures are monitored and reviewed in order to identify indirect 
discrimination by disability, whether relative pay rates are reviewed by disability 
and whether in filling vacancies the firm has any special procedure for 
encouraging the application of disabled people. 
 
Since the above are likely to be different aspects of a more general commitment 
of the firm against disability, I used factor analysis to create a common factor 
describing firms' anti-discrimination behaviour which can be used in place of the 
single variables to avoid multicollinearity. Table 4.1 shows the contribution of 
each analysed practice in the determination of the common factor. It also shows 
that in the main the extracted factor summarises data very well. 
 
                                            
23   The intermediate steps are `the managers inform representatives about training' and `the 
managers consult representative about training'. 
24    In order to derive it, I used the section in the employers' questionnaire called `fair 
treatment at work' which was highly improved in the 2004 cross section. The section contains rich 
information about the degree of implementation within the firm of different policies against 
discrimination against people in poor health. 
23 Table 4.1: Factor analysis for the variable describing the degree of discrimination 
against disabled 
 
Eigenvalue  2.662       
   factor loadings Uniqueness  Scoring coefficients
written policy  0.307 0.906 0.062
monitor recruitment  0.682 0.535 0.213
review recruitment  0.726 0.473 0.234
monitor promotions  0.759 0.424 0.27
review promotions  0.76 0.422 0.274
review relative pay rates  0.481 0.768 0.093
fill vacancies  0.436 0.81 0.092
 
Although anti discrimination practices are very unlikely to influence directly the 
overall training, the variable has been included in order to control for unobserved 
firms' attitude towards disability. In fact, in order to avoid biased estimates of the 
coefficient for disability, the unobserved firm effect, after controlling for the 
covariates at firm level, must be uncorrelated with the variable of interest. 
 
Finally, I controlled for firm size (in linear and quadratic form) and  for a variable 
indicating the average period of time it takes for the newly hired to become able 
to do their job as well as more experienced workers already employed in the 
firm.
25 This variable can be interesting for two reasons. First of all, it can 
measure the average complexity of the task performed in the firm. Following 
Schumacher and Baldwin (2000), we argue that there could be endogenous 
sorting of disabled people in less complicated jobs. Hence, when omitted 
requirements of the job are correlated with disability status, the estimates of the 
effect of health condition on the outcomes in the labour market can be biased.
26 
The second reason observes that the time it takes for a new hired employee to 
become as skilled as an experienced worker is correlated with training. 
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) use the number of weeks it takes until a new 
hired becomes fully trained as a control in an equation analysing the 
determinants of training. The authors interpret the variable as a proxy of on-the-
job training and they find a positive relationship between job complexity and 
actual training. If interpreted as a proxy of the amount of on-the-job training, a 
positive correlation implies a form of complementarity between on-the-job and 
ff-the-job training. 
 
                                           
o
 
 
 
 
25   in the tables it is called `difficulty' 
26   the paper focus on wage differentials, but the argument can be reasonably extended to 
other outcomes in the labour market. 
24 CHAPTER FIVE 
Empirical Analysis  
For the empirical analysis we use a set of different econometric models whose 
common characteristic is separating the two parts of the process of investing in 
human capital. The first set of models exploits the multilevel nature of my data 
since the individual observations are nested into firms. The second set of models 
follows Cragg (1971), but it explicitly accounts for the fact that days of training 
are recorded in bands. 
5.1 random intercept and random coefficient models  
 
Let 
*
ij y  be the latent variable indicating the propensity of receiving training. We 
can now define two new variables for training incidence  ij y  and training intensity 
ij y ~
. The former takes only two possible values (0 and 1), while the latter can take 
5 different values corresponding to each of the positive intervals in which the 
data are recorded. 
 
I have estimated ij y , through logit models. The latent variable specification for the 
logit is the following: 
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ij y ~
 has been estimated through ordered-logit models using only positive records. 
The formula for ordered logit is: 
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(2) 
 
where  1 κ ,  2 κ ,  3 κ ,  4 κ ,  4 κ are the thresholds, 1-5 are the possible outcomes: less 
than one day of training, one to less than two days, two to less than five days, 
five to less than ten days, ten days or more. 
For each model I have allowed for two types of firm specific random effects: a 
linear one determining a random intercept and a multiplicative one which takes 
the form of a random coefficient for the variable disability. The rationale for this 
25 second random effect is studying whether, after controlling for the relevant firm 
specific characteristics, firm specific unobserved characteristics make poor 
health status to have differential consequences on training. 
 
The equation for the latent variable measuring the `propensity for receiving 
training' can be written as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ij j ij ij j j ij x x d y ε β β ζ β ζ β + + + + + + = 4
'
3
'
2 2 1 1
* (3) 
 
or 
 
ij j ij j j ij ij ij d x x d y ε ζ ζ β β β β + + + + + + = 1 2 4
'
3
'
2 1
*
 
(4) 
 
Where  ij d is the dummy variable indicating the health status of person i in firm j, 
ij x is a vector of individual and match specific covariates describing worker i in 
firm j,  j x is a vector of firm specific covariates for firm j and  ij ε  has a standard 
logistic distribution (with variance equal to 
2 π ). 
 
j 1 ζ is a firm specific random intercept i.e. the deviation from the mean intercept 
1 β  due to firm characteristics.  j 2 ζ is the random slope i.e. the firm specific 
deviation from the mean slope  j 2 β . 
 
Variances and covariance between the two random effects are: 
 
( ) 11 1 ψ ζ = j Var   (5) 
 
( ) 22 2 ψ ζ = j Var   (6) 
 
( ) 21 2 1 , ψ ζ ζ = j j Cov   (7) 
 
 
Moreover, we also have: 
 
0 1 = β   (8) 
 
where (8) is the usual restriction for ordinal logit for identifying the thresholds. 
Comparing dichotomous logit and ordered logit models suggests a strategy for 
the identification of causal effects. Controlling for a large set of covariates is not 
always desirable, therefore, even controlling for observed firm and individual 
characteristics, there might be still some potential source of endogeneity, due to 
an omitted variable problem. 
In this paper we are not interested in the effect of disability per se on training, but 
we want to study how the effect of disability changes when more information is 
26 made available and when a selected subgroup of workers is taken into account. 
In this way, we do not need to assume complete exogeneity but only that the 
potential endogeneity has a comparable effect across all the stages of the 
process. 
 
Results 
 
I analysed training incidence and training intensity allowing both for a single 
near firm effect and for two firm effects: a random coefficient and a random 
ults 
 terms of size and significance of the coefficients. The main difference is that, in 
model can be seen as a restricted version of the 
ndom coefficient model, I used a likelihood ratio test comparing the value of the 
li
intercept. The results are contained in tables 5.1, 5.2., 5.3. and 5.4 . The models 
in column (1) include only few individual variables: age, sex, ethnicity and 
disability i.e. those characteristics which are thought to be related with some form 
of discrimination. The results in column (2) refer to a more complicated model 
including the full set of covariates at the individual level, finally column (3) 
contains the full model using both individual and firm specific characteristics. 
 
Random coefficient and random intercept models yield exactly the same res
in
the case of random coefficient models, few additional parameters are estimated 
and they include the variance of the multiplicative effect and the covariance 
between the two unobserved firm effects. The estimated values for the variance 
of the second random effect suggest that the random coefficient model does not 
seem to fit the data better that the simple random intercept model. However, in 
order to prove it formally, I tested the null hypothesis of zero variance for the 
multiplicative random effect. 
 
Since the random intercept 
ra
likelihood in the two specifications (Table 5.1 summarises the results). The main 
problem for this test is that the hypothesis that the slope of the coefficient for 
disability does not vary across firms lies at the boundary of the parameter space, 
as a consequence, the usual chi-square test with two degrees of freedom for the 
two additional parameters (variance of the second random effect and covariance 
between the two effects) cannot be used. The solution suggested by Snijders 
and Bosker (1999) is dividing the p-value by two, thus making less restrictive the 
criteria leading to reject the null. However, the minuscule values I got for the test 
statistics especially for training incidence, is not high enough to make the 
hypothesis of using random coefficient attractive. 
 
27 Table 5.1: random intercept and random coefficient models 
 
incidence 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  r.i. r.c. r.i. r.c. r.i.  r.c. 
log likelihood  -8224.23 -8223.83 -7834.97  -7834.6  -7473.41  -7473.11 
1.231 1.256 0.953 0.973 0.827  0.844  var(1) 
(0.086) (0.092) (0.073) (0.078) (0.067)  (0.072) 
 0.007  0.006   0.005  var(2) 
 (0.015)  (0.014)   (0.014) 
 -0.091  -0.078   -0.067  cov(2,1) 
 (0.101)  (0.091)   (0.087) 
cor(2,1)   -1  -1   -1 
LR test  0.810 0.742   
intensity 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  r.i. r.c. r.i. r.c. r.i.  r.c. 
log likelihood  -12411.2 -12411.2 -12070.3 -12070.3 -11547.7  -11547.5 
0.400 0.399 0.368 0.371 0.330  0.339  var(1) 
(0.041) (0.043) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040)  (0.040) 
 0.000  0.001   0.005  var(2) 
 (0.000)  (0.004)   (0.013) 
 0.00  -0.01   -0.04  cov(2,1) 
 (0.056)  (0.056)   (0.056) 
cor(2,1)   1  -1   -1 
LR test  0.004 0.07 0.502 
 
 
28 Table 5.2: training incidence 
 
incidence 
type  min var  individual   firm 
sample size (lev2)  13379  13071  12548 
sample size (lev1)  1238  1235  1177 
age  0.001 0.005 -0.001 
age  squared  0.000**  0.000  0.000 
male    0.220*** 0.146*** 0.143*** 
ethnic  minority  -0.041 -0.098 -0.073 
disabled -0.135**  -0.334*  -0.372* 
tenure shorter than 1 yr   no  -0.189**  -0.165** 
tenure longer than 2 yrs  no  -0.372***  -0.393*** 
disabled*<1y tenure  no  0.225  0.208 
disabled*>2y tenure  no  0.254  0.281 
individual controls  no  yes  yes 
long expected tenure  no  no  0.076 
neither long nor short 
expected tenure  no no 0.090 
any meeting, no training  no  no  -0.338*** 
no meetings, no training  no  no  -0.930*** 
training negotiated wt 
representatives  no no 0.207 
no discrimination   no  no  0.203*** 
firm  specific  controls  no no yes 
note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
29 Tables 5.2 and 5.3. show the results I got by running random intercept 
logit/ordered logit models for the variables `training incidence' and `training 
intensity'.
27 In the model studying training incidence (see table 8), disability is 
associated with lower access to training.
28 If the employers think that, on 
average, disabled people have a higher probability of leaving the firm, they will 
offer less training to workers in poor health.
29 This could explain the negative and 
significant coefficient we found for training incidence. The coefficient on disability 
becomes even more negative when the individual controls are added and it 
further decreases in the model including firm level variables. The drop in the 
coefficient for disability after taking into account the characteristics of the 
workplace suggests that disabled people tend to select into firm providing a 
greater amount of training, however, such an effect is small in size. 
 
The coefficients for the dummy variables indicating the respondent's tenure are 
both negative and statistically significant, thus confirming what shown by my 
descriptive statistics i.e. that the peak in the proportion of those receiving training 
is reached in the period of time between one year and two years of tenure. 
However, the most negative coefficient is found for the group of those having 
longer tenure indicating that some form of induction training takes place in the 
first year of tenure and that the incidence of the investment in human capital 
decreases for workers who have been working in the firm for long time. 
 
The coefficients for the interaction terms are positive but non statistically 
significant, suggesting that the probability of getting trained for disabled 
employees does not change over time. Analogously, expected tenure does not 
seem to play a role in determining the probability of being trained, given that 
neither of the two variables indicating the length of the expected time horizon of 
the investment turns out to be significant (although both have the expected sign). 
Again, the probability of being trained is positively associated with the existence 
of meetings where training is directly discussed, while negotiation with union and 
non union representatives is not statistically significant. 
 
The individual and the firm specific controls have in general the expected sign, 
which does not change across specification. However, for some of the firm level 
variables commonly used in the literature: firm size (see: Adams (1970); 
Schumacher and Baldwin (2000); Holtmann and Idson (1991); Brown (1990); 
Dunne and Schmitz (1995); Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1987)) and 
`difficulty of the job' (Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999)) we found minuscule 
coefficients. The first result suggests that, once we control for differences in the 
organisational practices implemented in the workplace, firm size per se has a 
negligible effect. The real importance of the effect is, obviously, not clear, given 
that scale economies for large firms can be associated with the use of practices 
favouring training. It means that firm size influences training at least through an 
indirect channel. However, it seems that controlling only for firm size hides much 
of the heterogeneity at firm level, which can be correlated (although not 
                                            
27   the complete results (tables 18 and 19) are shown in appendix.} 
28   this is in contrast with what Addison and Belfield (2004) found for WERS 1998, however 
the question contained in WERS 1998 does not explicitly exclude `health and safety training'. 
This could mask the real process of investing in human capital for disabled people 
29   It applies also if disabled do not have lower productivity than non-disabled 
30 necessarily due) to firm scale. The coefficient associated with my measure of the 
difficulty of the job is unsurprisingly positive, showing that more difficult jobs 
require also greater amount of off-the-job training. If, as suggested by 
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999), we interpret the variable as a proxy for 
`learning-by-doing', the result shows that there is complementarity rather than 
substitution between the two forms of investment in human capital. 
 
If we look at training intensity (table 5.3.) we can notice that most of the variables 
of interest have a different behaviour in the two parts of the process. 
 
5.2 estimating the two processes jointly 
 The previous section suggests that the variables determining training incidence 
and training intensity are indeed different, however, it seems that, after 
controlling for the rich set of firm level variables, unobserved firm effects, 
especially multiplicative firm effects for the variable disability seem to play a 
minor role. Moreover, the previous approach has the disadvantage of limiting the 
sample size for the study of training intensity since only positive records are 
used. Finally, ordered logit do not really allow taking into account the differences 
in the actual number of days of training since they rely on rankings rather than on 
quantities. The following models use the whole sample size for both training 
incidence and training intensity while exploiting the variation in the length of 
training programmes. All the models from this section onwards are estimated 
through maximum likelihood. 
 
The first model we estimate is the simplest possible. The decision leading 
training incidence is estimated through a probit model, while the process 
determining training intensity is represented by a standard regression modified to 
take into account of the bounded nature of my data and obviously truncated at 
zero. The main drawback of this model is that it might not be appropriate when 
the distribution of positive records is skewed. The second model addresses this 
problem by adding to the initial probit model a logarithmic regression which fits 
data which are both positive and positively skewed (see figure 5.1.). Also this 
model uses interval regression for fitting bounded data. 
 
 
31 Figure 5.1:  distribution of training 
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Table 5.4. shows the results for the two models. The variables I have used are 
pretty much the same I used in the models I commented in the previous sections. 
However, although it is not specifically required for the identification of the 
models, the covariates I used for the two parts are not exactly the same as for 
the multilevel models, being the dummy variables indicating expected tenure 
excluded from the specification for the initial probit. In fact, the regressions for 
training incidence alone show that expected tenure does not seem to play any 
role in determine training incidence. The results for the first hurdle are obviously 
the same in both models, since the logarithmic transformation is applied only to 
the second part of the process, however, also the results for training intensity do 
not seem to differ significantly, suggesting that failing to correct for the skewness 
does not bias significantly the results. In general, the conclusion we draw from 
these estimates are the same we present earlier in the paper, suggesting that the 
results are quite robust across specifications. 
 
32 Table 5.4: two parts models 
 
  probit + normal  probit+ lognormal 
training intensity                                   
age  -0.01       0.01      
age squared  -0.00       -0.00*     
male  0.46***    0.14***   
ethnic minority  -0.36**     -0.12**    
disabled  0.57       0.12      
extra hours  -0.68***    -0.24***   
o level  0.03       0.03      
a level  0.10       0.06      
degree  0.09       0.08*     
tenure shorter than 1 year  0.47***    0.12***   
tenure longer than 2 years  -0.16       -0.04      
disabled*<1y tenure  -1.47***    -0.36**    
disabled*>2y tenure  -0.52       -0.09      
long expected tenure  0.26*      0.10**    
neither long nor short e. tenure  0.23       0.09*     
any meeting, no training  -0.33***    -0.11***   
no meetings, no training  -0.62**     -0.23***   
training negotiated wt representatives  -0.01       -0.01      
no discrimination  0.03       0.02      
Constant  4.03***    0.72***   
individual controls  yes  yes 
firm specific controls  yes  yes 
variance  3.56***    1.06***   
training incidence                                   
age  0.01       0.01      
age squared  -0.00       -0.00      
male  0.03       0.03      
ethnic minority  -0.00       -0.00      
disabled  -0.19*      -0.19*     
extra hours  -0.23***    -0.23***   
o level  0.18***    0.18***   
a level  0.29***    0.29***   
degree  0.39***    0.39***   
tenure shorter than 1 year  -0.07       -0.07      
tenure longer than 2 years  -0.20***    -0.20***   
disabled*<1y tenure  0.10       0.10      
disabled*>2y tenure  0.14       0.14      
any meeting, no training  -0.19***    -0.19***   
no meetings, no training  -0.53***    -0.53***   
training negotiated wt representatives  0.09       0.09      
no discrimination  0.10***    0.10***   
Constant  0.13       0.13      
individual controls  yes  yes 
firm specific controls  yes  yes 
 
 
33 Table 5.3: training intensity 
 
intensity  
type min  var  individual  firm 
sample size (lev2)  8129 7960 7626 
sample size (lev1)  1162 1151 1098 
age  0.01 0.006  0.005 
age  squared  0.00** 0.000  0.000 
male   0.33*** 0.239***  0.236*** 
ethnic minority  -0.14 -0.196**  -0.159* 
disabled  0.00 0.244  0.204 
tenure shorter than 1 yr   no  0.231*** 0.216*** 
tenure longer than 2 yrs  no  -0.037 -0.058 
disabled*<1y tenure  no  -0.579** -0.552** 
disabled*>2y tenure  no  -0.207 -0.176 
individual controls  no  yes  yes 
long expected tenure  no  no  0.201** 
neither long nor short  
expected tenure  no no 0.179 
any meeting, no training  no  no  -0.176** 
no meetings, no training  no  no  -0.364** 
training negotiated wt 
representatives  no no -0.123 
no discrimination   no  no  0.044 
firm  specific  controls  no no yes 
 note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
First of all, the behaviour of the variable disability is completely reverted: the 
coefficient on disability becomes positive (though not statistically significant) 
indicating that on average disabled employees in the selected group of trained 
workers are likely to be perceived to be as `safe' as non-disabled employees. 
Also tenure does not seem to be as important as in the previous model, given 
that the band of longer tenure does not appear to be significantly different from 
the omitted category.  
 
34 The most interesting results are perhaps the ones regarding the interaction terms 
between tenure and disability. Disabled employees in their first year of tenure get 
significantly less training than every other category, even if the coefficient for the 
two dummies considered separately are not negative. The idea is that firms have 
very little information on newly hired workers, as a consequence, they must 
compute the expected returns to training by relying on easily observed 
characteristics. When the employers are not able to distinguish between `safe' 
and unsafe `workers', the presence of disability can be seen as a bad signal for 
the employers. After the first year and as long as the employees stay with the 
firm, the employers collect enough information allowing them to have more 
precise beliefs on who the `risky' disabled employees are. Therefore, the 
managers start making their decisions on the basis of characteristics that in the 
first stage are unobserved. We think this creates a `separating equilibrium' where 
safe disabled employees get high amounts of training while risky disabled 
employees do not have access to training at all. It can also explain why the 
interaction term is not significant for training incidence. 
 
One might argue that a spell of disability can start also after the worker is hired. 
In this case employers are not able to assess the severity of the impairment even 
when the worker has been working in the firm for long time. It could break the 
explained relationship between disability and tenure which works through an 
increasing amount of information. However, we believe that the negative effect of 
disability for senior workers disappears also in this scenario. In fact, even when 
the firm does not have information about the severity of the illness, in the case of 
senior workers employers can use part of the information that was hidden in the 
first stage. As a consequence, in making they choices the managers do not need 
to rely on indices, since they can use the information they have been collecting 
throughout time on a broad set of initially hard-to-observe characteristics. When 
more information is available, the presence of a physical impairment does not 
influence firms' expectation any longer. 
 
An alternative hypothesis is that firms use Bayesian learning to estimate the 
probability of leaving the job. As a consequence, expectations on workers' 
expected tenure are not formed only by taking into account people's health 
status, but also by considering their past job history within the firm. Hence, the 
probability of leaving the firm for a disabled employee who has been working in 
the workplace for at least two years does not need to be lower that the same 
probability estimated for a worker in good health with the same tenure. Only in 
this case, the insurgence of an impairment at a later stage of people's career can 
lead to misleading conclusions. 
 
Another interesting result is the one regarding the expected time horizon of the 
investment, since the variable indicating long expected tenure is now positive 
and significant. We interpret this by observing that, before undertaking a costly 
investment in human capital, the firms take into account the future stream of 
revenues given by an increase in productivity. If the value of the investment is big 
enough to counterbalance the cost of training, the investment takes place. It 
explains the positive relationship between expected tenure and training. 
 
35 The variable constructed via factor analysis and proxying for firms' behaviour 
against discrimination on the basis of disability has a positive and significant 
coefficient only in the model studying training incidence. Once again, it confirms 
the hypothesis according to which indices and firm level variables are more likely 
to affect training when we consider the whole workforce, while individual 
characteristics matter more in the selected sample of trained workers. The 
behaviour of the other firm specific variables does not differ from the previous 
model and we will not discuss it. In fact, since firm characteristics are likely to be 
endogenous with respect to training, we decided to focus only on the variables 
whose effect changes in the two models. 
Instead, some of the individual controls behave differently for training incidence 
and training intensity. For example, while education appears to be significant in 
determining training incidence, its effect on training intensity is much weaker. 
Education seems to have mainly the function of signalling those who are suitable 
for training, while it does seem to determine the amount of the investment. This is 
more in line with the theory of signalling than with the idea that education raises 
productivity directly by increasing the returns to training. While belonging to an 
ethnic minority was not significant in the case of training incidence, it has a 
negative coefficient for training intensity. It can happen because well 
consolidated affirmative policies against racism succeed in guaranteeing equal 
access to training for everybody, but they do not fill the gap between different 
groups when the length of the training programmes is considered. 
36 5.3 Excess of zeros and double hurdle models. 
In this paragraph we address the problem of the existence of `excess of zeros'. 
The main idea behind it is that some of the null records we observe in the dataset 
are not `real' zeros. There are two reasons why we can observe a zero value 
when the propensity of getting trained is, in principle, positive. the first one is due 
to reporting, given that it might be a discrepancy between the timing of giving 
training and the timing of its reporting, since the plan of investing in workers' 
human capital does not necessarily coincide with the period of time over which 
training is recorded. However, there is no reason why this bias should affect 
different categories of people in a different way, so we will not discuss it. The 
second reason is more interesting. There are some factors that, even when the 
worker `deserves' training, can inhibit the investment in human capital, they can 
be due, as explained by Cragg (1971), to transaction costs, search costs or lack 
of information. We think the last case applies to my analysis. Hence, we can look 
at the results of the double hurdle model as a proxy of what it would have 
happened if we did not have excess of zeros. If we believe that the excess of 
zeros comes from a lack of information, this implies that double hurdle models 
show us the behaviour of the determinants of training when signals are 
substituted by the underlying information.  
 
Let suppose that, in order to be trained, the workers must cross two hurdles, the 
first hurdle determining whether the individuals have any chance of receiving 
training and the second one indicating whether the investment takes place. 
Therefore, those who did not reach the first hurdle can be considered those who 
are excluded from training since they are perceived as `bad investments', while 
the zero records observed for those who crossed the first hurdle may be due to 
the effect of current circumstances. Finally, those who did report any training are 
those who crossed the second hurdle. 
 
Both hurdles are defined by an equation based on personal and firm 
characteristics, but, like in my previous models, the sign and the magnitude of 
the coefficients in the two equations do not have to be the same. 
The standard double hurdle models 
 
The double hurdle models are defined by two equations: 
 
ij ij ij x h ε α + =
' *
  (9) 
 
ij ij ij z y η β + =
' * *
  (10) 
 
where 
'
ij x and 
'
ij z  are matrices including match specific and firm specific variables. 
Note again that the two matrices do not need to be the same. 
 
37 In the standard double hurdle models, the errors are normally and independently 
distributed as follows. 
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The first hurdle can be written: 
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while the second hurdle takes the form: 
 
( ) 0 , max
* * *
ij ij y y =   (13) 
 
and the observed value of the dependent variable is determined as: 
 
*
ij ij ij y h y =   (14) 
 
Finally, the log likelihood function becomes: 
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38 My specification 
 
 
The standard double hurdle model does not seem the best way of fitting my data. 
First of all, in order to take into account the skewness of the distribution, we must 
transform the dependent variable, since double hurdle models imply normally 
distributed errors. The logarithmic transformation we have used earlier in the 
paper is clearly inadequate, given the high proportion of zeros in my sample, as a 
consequence, following Jones and Yen (2000), we transformed the dependent 
variable by using the Box-Cox transformation according to the formula: 
 
λ
λ 1 −
=
y
y
T  
(16) 
 
Where λ  ranges from 0 to 1. 
 
The Box Cox transformation permits to accommodate the skewness of the 
distribution, while allowing a certain degree of flexibility. Both the linear and the 
logarithmic transformations can be obtained as special cases of the Box Cox 
model when λ  is close to the boundaries of the space of the parameters (when 
λ  tends to zero my model tends to the logarithmic transformation, while when λ  
tends to one my model approximates the linear transformation). Lastly, due to the 
bounded nature of my data, we wrote the likelihood contribution from positive 
records by using interval regression (see Moffatt (2005)). 
 
Therefore, the equation for the first hurdle is equal to (12), while the second 
hurdle becomes: 
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if  1 = ij d  
and  
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if  0 = ij d  
 
Finally, the log likelihood can be written as: 
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where  I(.) is the indicator function defining the intervals in which the latent 
variable falls, while 
T
j a and 
T
j b are the extremes of each interval after applying the 
Box Cox transformation. 
 
Results 
 
Table 5.5. shows the results I got by using the double hurdle model we presented 
above. First of all let us notice that the value we estimated for  λ is equal to 0.69, 
which is neither a logarithmic nor a linear transformation. This is an encouraging 
result, given that a value of  λ close to zero would have been problematic in the 
case of the null records, while a value of  λ close to one would not have 
corrected significantly the skewness of the distribution. Figure 5.2. shows the 
new distribution of training after applying the Box Cox transformation with λ  
equal to the estimated value from my model. 
40 Figure 5.2: distribution of training after Box Cox transformation 
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More interestingly, the pattern we have discussed for disability does not change 
and we still have a negative and significant coefficient for training incidence and 
a positive (although not significant) coefficient for training intensity. The result 
seems to be particularly strong now, suggesting a sharp separation between a 
small number of `good quality' trained disabled employees who get training at 
least as much as non disabled people and a group of disabled people which 
does not get training at all, also when we correct for the excess of zeros. 
When we look at the interactions between disability and tenure, we notice that 
after the correction there is a perfect relationship between the probability of 
getting training for each band of tenure and the amount of training people get, in 
particular, when most of the investment takes place (between the first and the 
second year of tenure), the probability of being selected for a disabled employee 
is the lowest, but the amount of training selected disabled people get is the 
highest. This suggests a scenario where firms are able to discriminate among 
disabled workers. 
 
Finally, two minor observations. In the `probit-normal model' and in the `probit-
lognormal model' the variables indicating education are significant just for training 
incidence. We have already discussed this result for the case of multilevel 
models observing that it is in line with the theory of signalling. It is interesting 
noticing that now we got the same result as before although we used the same 
sample size for both parts of the process. However, such a distinction disappears 
in the double hurdle models and the results we got seem to corroborate the 
thesis looking at education as a productive form of investment in human capital. 
Finally the double hurdle model shows that when we account for the excess of 
zeros we find lower incidence of training for mail workers, suggesting that a 
41 positive discrimination in favour of males might take place in the provision of 
training. 
 
Table 5.5: double hurdle models 
 
 double  hurdle 
training intensity                  
age 0.03 
age squared  -0.00**    
male  0.41***   
ethnic minority  -0.30*     
disabled 0.51 
extra hours  -0.80***   
o level  0.38***   
a level  0.72***   
degree  0.93***   
tenure shorter than 1 year  0.23 
tenure longer than 2 years  -0.40***   
disabled*<1y tenure  -1.35**    
disabled*>2y tenure  -0.56 
long expected tenure  0.43***   
neither long nor short e. tenure  0.37**    
any meeting, no training  -0.42***   
no meetings, no training  -1.56***   
training negotiated wt representatives  0.47 
no discrimination  0.04 
Constant  -1.24**    
individual controls  yes 
firm specific controls  yes 
variance  3.64***   
training incidence                  
age -0.05 
age squared  0 
male  -0.23*     
ethnic minority  0.19 
disabled  -1.24***   
extra hours  -0.36***   
o level  0.32**    
a level  0.27 
degree  0.32*     
tenure shorter than 1 year  -0.54*     
tenure longer than 2 years  -0.58**    
disabled*<1y tenure  1.79**    
disabled*>2y tenure  1.09***   
any meeting, no training  -0.35***   
no meetings, no training  -0.17 
training negotiated wt representatives  -0.56*     
no discrimination  4.86***   
Constant  5.93***   
individual controls  yes 
firm specific controls  yes 
lambda  0.69***   
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Concluding remarks 
 
The process of investing in human capital can be divided in two parts. In the first 
stage the firm decides whether to give some positive amount of training to each 
worker, while in the second part it determines the length of the training. In 
particular, when available information is scarce, ill-health is perceived as a 
characteristic signalling `risky' workers, since it is often associated with shorter 
expected tenure due to high probabilities of dropping out of the labour force. It 
can explain the negative coefficient we got for newly hired disabled people in the 
model explaining training incidence. 
 
However, if we consider only the group of trained workers, poor health conditions 
do not seem to determine a lower investment in human capital. We argue that it 
may be due to the fact that the sub sample of trained workers is different from the 
workforce as a whole along a set of dimensions which are relevant for my 
analysis. In fact, workers who got training are likely to be a `selected' sub 
sample, given that the firm has chosen to invest in them. In particular, we think 
that disabled workers belonging to this group are more likely to be of the type of 
workers we labelled as `safe'. It explains why poor health conditions do not have 
a negative effect on training intensity. This is also a reason why the negative 
effect of disability decreases with tenure as shown by the descriptive statistics. 
Moreover, my results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms use 
Bayesian learning to evaluate the net present value of the investment in human 
capital for disabled people. 
 
Using double hurdle models allowing for excess of zeros, we tried to correct for 
all the factors determining zero records for those having a positive propensity of 
getting training. In my case this result can describe a situation when the lack of 
information is reduced. We found that in this new scenario there is a clear 
separation between a group of disabled people who get more training that non 
disabled people and a group of workers in poor health who do not get training at 
all. If we correct for the difference in the null records we also find evidence in 
favour of the theory of education as investment in human capital and for the 
presence of a positive discrimination towards men in the access to training. 
 
Unfortunately it is not possible to evaluate the effect of the anti discrimination law 
on the provision of training for disabled people, since this would require some 
longitudinal information we do not have in WERS. However, some conclusions 
can be drawn on the role of information in the investment in human capital and 
on how the anti-discrimination measures can help conjugating efficiency and 
equality. Our analysis using the double 
43 hurdle models suggests that filling the informational gap could lead to different 
outcomes for different groups of disabled people with a sub group of disabled 
workers excluded from the investment in human capital and another sub group 
receiving an amount of training comparable to or bigger than the one offered to 
workers in good health. This could create, for the workers having any 
impairment, incentives not to reveal their real health status which on the one 
hand could lead to inefficiencies, given that the employers would not able to 
predict the expected returns of the investment in human capital, on the other 
hand it could have negative consequences for the disabled workers themselves, 
who would not be able to claim their rights as protected under the Disability 
Discrimination Act. 
 
The anti discrimination law, together with a set of mechanisms rewarding those 
firms investing in disabled people can overcome such a difficulty,  making it 
possible for everybody to enhance his skills irrespectively of his health status. 
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49 Annex A: Estimates of 
disability 
 
A1.1. Estimates of disability according to different surveys in 
the UK 
 
There is no a widely accepted definition of disability nor there exists a unique 
way for measuring it. The most important surveys for the UK have adopted both 
different measures of disability and different strategies for the question wording. 
As a consequence, the estimates of the proportion of disabled people vary a lot 
even when we compare sub samples having analogous characteristics. 
 
I have estimated the proportion of disabled people by using both the British 
Household Panel Survey (wave 15) and the Labour Force Survey. In both cases I 
considered just those respondents who were in paid employment and I have 
excluded both employees and self employed. I did so because I want my 
estimates to be as comparable as possible with the WERS data. I will present a 
set of estimates using different surveys for the UK in order to derive an estimate 
of the number of LSI and WLD disabled. In fact, WERS data on disability are not 
completely coherent and further analysis is required in order to identify who the 
disabled are. 
 
The first survey I considered is the Labour Force Study. The survey is interesting 
for my comparison because of its presenting different definitions of disability, in 
addition, the LFS questions do not differ much from the ones used in WERS and 
they permit to derive an estimate of the number of workers having a work limiting 
disability (WLD). In fact, in both surveys the respondents are first asked whether 
they have an illness or disability and then they are asked whether such an 
impairment limits the amount or the kind of job they might do. It makes it possible 
estimating both the proportion of LSI disabled and the proportion of WLD 
disabled. The first question in LFS is almost the same as the one in WERS. It 
asks: Do you have any health problems or disabilities that you expect will last for 
more than a year?'. Then two different questions ask whether the impairments 
affect the kind and the type of work people might do. The exact question wording 
is: `Does this health problem affect the kind of paid work that you might do?' and 
`Does this health problem affect the amount of paid work that you might do?' 
 
The first question permits to derive an estimate of the number of people living 
with a LSI disability, while a combination of the second and the third question 
permits to estimate the proportion of WLD disabled. I have considered WLD 
disabled those answering that their disability affects the kind OR the amount of 
work they can do and I have estimated their proportion in the selected sub 
sample by using the sample weights. I have also excluded workers living in 
 50Northern Ireland in order to make the data comparable with those in the WERS 
survey. 
 
Table A.1. shows the proportion of British workers for each health status as 
emerges from LFS data. We can notice that, according to the estimates derived 
by LFS data, those who do not have a LSI disability are nearly 80 per cent, while 
the disabled whose disability does not affect the amount or the type of job they 
do are twice ad much as the WLD disabled. The question wording and the order 
of the questions does seem to affect the measures of disability. Before spring 
1997 the LFS respondents were first asked whether they had a work limiting 
disability and then whether such an impairment was perceived to last for more 
than one year. According to Cousins et al (1998) the change of the order of the 
questions adopted in the recent waves of the survey made people to underreport 
the WLD disability. 
 
 
Table A.1: health status according to the LFS 
 
   Percent Cum. 
good health  78.33 78.33 
affecting disability  7.69 86.01 
disability, unknown severity 0.05 86.06 
non affecting disability  13.81 99.87 
missing 0.13 100 
 
 
LFS contains also a derived variable distinguishing between different kinds of 
disabilities. Such a variable permits also to estimate the number of those 
considered disabled according to the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA 
disabled). It is derived by combining the three abovementioned questions plus 
another one asking whether the respondent's health status limits his activities 
(not necessarily at work).
30 Those answering they do not have a long lasting 
illness and those answering that their disability does not limit their day-to-day life 
are considered `non-disabled', while those having a limiting disability which does 
not affect the amount or the type of the job they can do are considered DDA 
disabled, but they are not considered WLD disabled. table A.2. reports the 
proportion of disabled according to this derived variable. 
 
Table A.2: disabled people according to the LFS 
 
   Percent Cum. 
dda disabled and work-limiting disabled  4.78 4.78 
dda disabled  5.03 9.81 
work-limiting disabled only  2.9 12.72 
non-disabled 87.28 100 
 
Here the percentage of those who can not be considered disabled is higher than 
in the previous estimate (87.28 per cent). It is due to the fact that those having a 
long lasting illness which does not limit the respondent's activities are not 
                                            
30   it can be considered a measure of Limiting Long Standing Illness (LLSI). 
 51considered disabled. It is worth noticing that different uses of the same survey 
can lead to big differences in the description of the respondents' health 
conditions. 
 
Let us consider now the estimates I have derived from the British Household 
Panel Survey. BHPS contains a very rich set of questions whose aim is 
assessing the health status of the respondent. However, I focused on the three 
questions which can be compared with the one in WERS. The first question I 
used asks the respondent whether he considers himself as a disabled. It is the 
question that can be more closely compared with the ones assessing the 
presence of long lasting illness or disability in WERS. In fact BHPS does not 
have a question explicitly asking for impairments which are likely to have effect in 
the long run. Table A.3. shows the estimated proportions. 
 
Table A.3: disabled people according to the BHPS (1) 
 
   Percent Cum. 
self declared disabled  2.84 2.84 
not self declared disabled  97.16 100 
 
 
According to the answers to this question, the percentage of disabled people in 
paid employment is below 3 per cent. It is much smaller than whatever estimate 
can be found in the literature. It is not surprising since we can seen that only a 
tiny percentage of those having a long lasting impairment consider themselves 
as disabled. As a consequence, the estimated percentage of `non-disabled' 
according to the answers to this question is likely to overestimate the number of 
people in good health. If my definition of `people in good health' indicates those 
who do not have a LSI, the above question can be considered an upper bound 
for the measure we are looking for. 
 
n order to define a lower bound I used a question asking whether the interviewed 
has any specific health problem listed in a card. I considered the proportion of 
people declaring they have no problems as a measure of the people in good 
health. This second question is really general, since the declared health problem 
should not be necessarily a long lasting one. Hence, the number of people who 
do not have any health problem according to the third question underestimates 
the number of people who do not have a LSI disability. We can think of this 
estimate as the lower bound for the measure we are looking for. 
 
 
Table A.4. shows that if we relax the requirement of the duration of the illness the 
situation changes sharply and less than a half of the sample declares not to have 
any health problem. The results are very different from the previous ones, so that 
we can derive only a very wide band suggesting that the share of people in good 
health should be somewhere between 50 per cent and 97 per cent with no clear 
indication on how to distinguish people having a non WLD impairment from non-
disabled. 
 
 52Table A.4: disabled people according to the BHPS (2) 
 
   Percent Cum. 
not in good health  50.37 50.37 
good health  49.63 100 
 
 
Estimating the number of the workers having a work limiting disability is easier 
than estimating non WLD disabled. In fact, the BHPS question is very similar to 
the one in WERS and it asks whether the respondent's health status limits the 
amount or the kind of work he can do. However, the status of WLD disabled is 
now assessed through a single question and it does not depend on a previous 
question asking for a presence of long term illness or disability. 
 
Table A.5: disabled people according to the BHPS (3) 
 
   Percent Cum. 
health condition limiting work  7.22 7.22 
non WLD (including people in good health)  92.78 100 
 
From table A.5. we can notice that the percentage estimated by BHPS data, 
once we selected a sub sample with the same characteristics, is very similar to 
the one we estimated by using LFS data and it is slightly higher than 7 per cent. 
Unfortunately very few surveys contain a question directly assessing the 
presence of WLD, so that is difficult to find further pieces of evidence confirming 
this finding. 
 
 53A1.2. WERS and my definition of disability 
 
We have already explained how the presence in WERS of two separate 
questions dealing with disability and the way in which the data are collected force 
the researcher to make some choices in order to define who a disabled is. In 
particular, it must be decided how to treat the group of people declaring they do 
not have a long lasting disability and then answering the question defining a 
Work Limiting Disability. Three different alternatives are possible: excluding the 
whole group from the analysis (choice 1), treating them as disabled either WLD 
or non-WLD according to their answer to the second question (choice 2) or 
treating them as people in good health by neglecting completely their responding 
to the question asking for WLD (choice 3). The first choice seems to be the better 
since it does not require any assumption about people's responding. However, it 
implies throwing away more than 1000 observation. In order to shed light of what 
the choice implies I have estimated the proportions of disabled people how it 
emerges by making the different assumptions. Table A.6. shows the results we 
got. 
 
Table A.6: disabled people in WERS 
 
   choice 1  choice 2  choice 3 
   Percent  Cum.  Percent Cum. Percent  Cum. 
good health  86.71  86.71  77.49 77.49 88.12  88.12 
WLD 5.21  91.92  4.66 82.15 4.66  92.78 
non WLD  8.08  100  17.85 100 7.22  100 
 
 
Choice 2 seems to be really unlikely, since it implies a disproportionately low 
percentage of people in good health and a disproportionately high percentage of 
people having a LSI if compared with those having a WLD. In fact, in LFS the 
number of people in good health is estimated around 78 per cent, but Bajekal et 
al. (2004) argue that the Labour Force Survey tends to overestimate the number 
of disabled. The percentage of disabled people we got through choice 2 is even 
below such a lower bound. In addition, LSI disables are more than three times as 
much as WLD disabled and the latter are a tiny 4 per cent, much lower than 
value of 7 per cent estimated by using both BHPS and LFS. Choice 1 and 3 are 
quite similar. The only difference is that through method one we got the highest 
percentage of WLD disabled which is also the estimates which is closest to the 
one I got by using other survey data. As a consequence, in spite of its cost in 
terms of sample size, we chose choice 1. 
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tables 
 
Table A2.1: training incidence (all the coefficients) 
 
incidence 
type min  var  individual  firm 
sample size (lev2)  13379  13071 12548 
sample size (lev1)  1238  1235 1177 
age  0.001 0.005 -0.001 
age  squared  0.000** 0.000  0.000 
male   0.220*** 0.146*** 0.143*** 
ethnic minority  -0.041 -0.098 -0.073 
disabled  -0.135** -0.334*  -0.372* 
couple   -0.001 0.017 
children     -0.058 -0.060 
extra hours     -0.424*** -0.423*** 
olevel     0.277*** 0.248*** 
alevel     0.471*** 0.426*** 
degree     0.642*** 0.612*** 
tenure shorter than 1 yr     -0.189** -0.165** 
tenure longer than 2 yrs    -0.372*** -0.393*** 
disabled*<1y tenure    0.225 0.208 
disabled*>2y tenure    0.254 0.281 
professional occupations     0.804*** 0.600*** 
Ass. professional and technical occupations    0.836*** 0.753*** 
Administrative and secretarial occupations    0.954*** 0.896*** 
Skilled trades occupations    -0.045 -0.040 
Personal service occupations    1.171*** 1.110*** 
Sales and customer service occupations    0.699*** 0.602*** 
Process, plant and machine operatives     -0.065 -0.037 
difficulty      0.007** 
firm size      0.000** 
firm size  squared     0.000** 
long expected tenure     0.076 
neither long nor short expected tenure     0.090 
any meeting, no training     -0.338*** 
no meetings, no training     -0.930*** 
training negotiated with representatives     0.207 
no discrimination      0.203*** 
constant    -0.416 
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intensity  
type  min var  individual   firm  
sample size (lev2)  8129 7960 7626 
sample size (lev1)  1162 1151 1098 
age  0.01 0.006  0.005 
age  squared  0.00** 0.000  0.000 
male   0.33*** 0.239***  0.236*** 
ethnic minority  -0.14 -0.196**  -0.159* 
disabled  0.00 0.244  0.204 
couple   0.019  0.016 
children    -0.051  -0.060 
extra hours    -0.422***  -0.430*** 
olevel    0.055  0.055 
alevel    0.125  0.119 
degree    0.169**  0.164** 
tenure shorter than 1 yr    0.231***  0.216*** 
tenure longer than 2 yrs   -0.037  -0.058 
disabled*<1y tenure   -0.579**  -0.552** 
disabled*>2y tenure   -0.207  -0.176 
professional occupations    0.458***  0.353*** 
Ass. professional and technical occupations   0.543***  0.504*** 
Administrative and secretarial occupations   0.470***  0.426*** 
Skilled trades occupations   0.408***  0.359*** 
Personal service occupations   0.739***  0.695*** 
Sales and customer service occupations   0.238**  0.161 
Process, plant and machine operatives    0.220*  0.195* 
difficulty     0.008*** 
firm size     0.000* 
firm size  squared    0.000 
long expected tenure    0.201** 
neither long nor short expected tenure    0.179 
any meeting, no training    -0.176** 
no meetings, no training    -0.364** 
training negotiated with representatives    -0.123 
no discrimination     0.044 
 
 
 56Table A2.3: training incidence (all the coefficients, two parts models) 
 
training incidence          
  probit +  probit+  double  
 normal  lognormal  hurdle 
age  0.01       0.01       -0.05 
age squared  -0.00       -0.00       0 
male  0.03       0.03       -0.23*     
cohabitation  0.02       0.02       0.05 
children  -0.03       -0.03       0.05 
minority  -0.00       -0.00       0.19 
disabled  -0.19*      -0.19*      -1.24***   
extra hours  -0.23***    -0.23***    -0.36***   
o level  0.18***    0.18***    0.32**    
a level  0.29***    0.29***    0.27 
degree  0.39***    0.39***    0.32*     
tenure shorter than 1 year  -0.07       -0.07       -0.54*     
tenure longer than 2 years  -0.20***    -0.20***    -0.58**    
disabled*<1y tenure  0.10       0.10       1.79**    
disabled*>2y tenure  0.14       0.14       1.09***   
Professional occupations  0.32***    0.32***    0.39 
Ass. Professional and technical occupations  0.37***    0.37***    0.38 
Administrative and secretarial occupations  0.46***    0.46***    5.39 
Skilled trades occupations  -0.01       -0.01       -0.17 
Personal service occupations  0.56***    0.56***    0.54*     
Sales and customer service occupations  0.33***    0.33***    0.36 
Process, plant and machine operatives  -0.03       -0.03       0.17 
difficulty  0.00***    0.00***    0 
firm size  0.00***    0.00***    0.00*     
firm size squared  -0.00***    -0.00***    0 
any meeting, no training  -0.19***    -0.19***    -0.35***   
no meetings, no training  -0.53***    -0.53***    -0.17 
training negotiated with representatives  0.09       0.09       -0.56*     
no discrimination  0.10***    0.10***    4.86***   
Constant  0.13       0.13       5.93***   
lambda        0.69***   
 
 
 57Table A2.4: training intensity (all the coefficients, two parts models) 
 
training intensity          
  probit + normal  probit+  double  
   normal  lognormal  hurdle 
age  -0.01       0.01       0.03 
age squared  -0.00       -0.00*      -0.00**    
male  0.46***    0.14***    0.41***   
cohabitation  -0.07       -0.00       -0.01 
children  -0.09       -0.03       -0.13 
minority  -0.36**     -0.12**     -0.30*     
disabled  0.57       0.12       0.51 
extra hours  -0.68***    -0.24***    -0.80***   
o level  0.03       0.03       0.38***   
a level  0.10       0.06       0.72***   
degree  0.09       0.08*      0.93***   
tenure shorter than 1 year  0.47***    0.12***    0.23 
tenure longer than 2 years  -0.16       -0.04       -0.40***   
disabled*<1y tenure  -1.47***    -0.36**     -1.35**    
disabled*>2y tenure  -0.52       -0.09       -0.56 
Professional occupations  0.62***    0.24***    1.10***   
Ass. Professional and technical occ  0.72***    0.29***    1.26***   
Administrative and secretarial occ  0.64***    0.25***    1.18***   
Skilled trades occ  0.42**     0.21***    0.53**    
Personal service occ  1.13***    0.40***    1.88***   
Sales and customer service occ  0.37**     0.12**     0.93***   
Process, plant and machine operatives  0.33*      0.12**     0 
difficulty  0.01***    0.00***    0.02***   
firm size  0.00***    0.00**     0.00**    
firm size squared  -0.00**     -0.00*      -0.00**    
long expected tenure  0.26*      0.10**     0.43***   
neither long nor short e. tenure  0.23       0.09*      0.37**    
any meeting, no training  -0.33***    -0.11***    -0.42***   
no meetings, no training  -0.62**     -0.23***    -1.56***   
training negotiated wt representatives  -0.01       -0.01       0.47 
no discrimination  0.03       0.02       0.04 
Constant  4.03***    0.72***    -1.24**    
sigma  3.56***    1.06***    3.64***   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58Department for Business, Innovation & Skills.  www.bis.gov.uk
First published November 2009.  © Crown copyright.  ISBN 978-0-85605-724-3.  09/09/NP.  URN 09/1320.